Ames Construction Inc v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Ames Construction Inc v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Claudia F. Berry; Michael W. Homer; Jesse C. Trentadue; Suitter Axland & Hanson; Attorneys for
Petitioner.
Unknown.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Ames Construction Inc v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, No. 950154 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6500
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
AMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY and KIM J. PETERSON, 
Respondents. 
95-0154-CA 
Case No. **##**—•* 
P r i o r i t y No. 7 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL DECISION OF THE 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 






. . i * 
,5S£is ^M 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. (#5037) 
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq. (#1535) 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, Esq. (#4691) 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Ames Construction, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
FILED 
AUG 0 41995 
COURT OFAF 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AMES CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY and KIM J. PETERSON, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 940154-CA 
Priority No. 7 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL DECISION OF THE 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. (#5037) 
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq. (#1535) 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, Esq. (#4691) 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Ames Construction, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. (#5037) 
MICHAEL W. HOMERf Esq. (#1535) 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, Esq. (#4691) 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Ames Construction, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
STATE OF UTAH 
Industrial Commission 
Department of Employment Security 
Board of Review 
Ms. Ruth Ann Pehrson 
140 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Neal G. Hart, Esq. 
HART & ASSOCIATES 
349 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Janet C. Graham, Esq. 
Attorney General 
STATE OF UTAH 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 1 
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 2 
POINT I: THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 2 
A. Respondents' Claim that Ames Did Not 
Completely Marshall the Evidence Which 
Supports the Board of Review's Factual 
Findings Is Incorrect 2 
B. The Board of Review's Findings Are Not 
Supported By Substantial Evidence 5 
POINT II: THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION THAT AMES 
DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE FOR DISCHARGING 
PETERSON IS NOT REASONABLE AND RATIONAL . . . 7 
CONCLUSION 9 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS7 "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
Petitioner Ames Construction, Inc. ("Ames"), submits the 
following comments and corrections to the Brief of Respondents 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of 
Employment Security ("Board of Review") and Kim J. Peterson 
("Peterson"). 
1. Respondents state at the bottom of page 5 of 
Respondents' Brief that Peterson "told Pack that in any event he 
could not flag on the next day because he had a doctor's 
appointment and a physical therapy appointment." In fact, there is 
no evidence that Peterson informed Pack he would not be to work the 
next day because of his doctor's appointment and physical therapy. 
Rather, Peterson simply informed Pack that he first had to see his 
doctor and physical therapist before going to work. The record 
does not reflect that Peterson led Pack to believe that Peterson 
would not come to work at all. Accordingly, Pack had every reason 
to expect Peterson to show up for work on Tuesday, January 18, even 
though he knew Peterson could not appear until later in the day. 
(See Petitioner's Statement of Relevant Facts ("Petitioner's 
Facts") ffl 10-11 in Brief of Petitioner.) 
2. Respondents state on the middle of page 6 that 
Peterson "had already reported to the employer the day before that 
he could not do the job he had scheduled for him." Again, the 
record does not reflect that Peterson ever told Pack or anyone else 
at Ames that he could not do the flagging job. He expressed 
misgivings about the job to Pack but Pack was never made aware 
(either Monday afternoon during the telephone conversation or the 
next day) that Peterson would obtain a note from Dr. Rosen on 
Tuesday, January 18, excusing him from the flagging job. (See 
Petitioner's Facts ffl 10-13.) 
3. Respondents state at the bottom of page 6 that 
Peterson "assumed that the employer would be informed about 
appointments scheduled with its own doctors." Ames does not employ 
or retain its own doctors and there is nothing in the record that 
reflects otherwise. Mr. Howell's statement merely reflects that 
Ames was in communication with the Kennecott Clinic. Mr. Howell's 
statements do not reflect that all appointments at the Kennecott 
Clinic were automatically reported to Ames. 
4. Respondents also refer at the bottom of page 6 to 
"Dr. Bates." Duane Bates ("Bates") is not a doctor. Its is Ames's 
understanding that Bates is a physician's assistant who works at 
the Kennecott Clinic. 
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S FACTUAL FINDINGS 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
A. Respondents' Claim that Ames Did Not Completely Marshall 
the Evidence Which Supports the Board of Review's Factual 
Findings Is Incorrect. 
According to respondents, additional evidence exists in 
the record—evidence not marshalled by Ames—which allegedly 
supports the Board of Review's findings. However, some of the 
additional "facts" enumerated by respondents are incorrect. 
Respondents state, for example, that "the doctor [Dr. Rosen, 
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Peterson's surgeon] then made several telephone calls on the 
claimant's behalf. (R. 67) " Although the record reflects that Dr. 
Rosen made telephone calls, no competent evidence exists* regarding 
who Dr. Rosen called or, indeed, whether any or all of the 
telephone calls were made on behalf of Peterson rather than another 
patient. The only other evidence in the record which reflects 
contact by Dr. Rosen's office is the note written by Bates stating 
that Pat, someone who worked for Dr. Rosen, contacted Bates to 
inform him that Dr. Rosen was referring worksite conflicts back to 
Dr. Harris. Bates then set up the appointment with Dr. Harris. 
There is no evidence in the record, other than Peterson's own 
speculation, that Dr. Rosen told anyone at Ames that Peterson 
should not or could not do the flagging job the next day 
(Wednesday, January 19) after seeing Dr. Harris and the physical 
therapist. (R. 16.) 
Respondents also make the unsupported statement that D. 
Bates is an associate of Dr. Rosen. This is incorrect. Dr. Rosen 
is an independent surgeon. Bates is a physician's assistant at the 
Kennecott Clinic. Thus, respondents' statement on the middle of 
page 11 that Peterson "was correct in assuming, without 
specifically being told, that Dr. Rosen and his staff were in 
contact with his supervisor" is unwarranted. The only facts in 
evidence are that Dr. Rosen's office spoke with personnel at the 
Kennecott Clinic and not with anyone at Ames. The fact that Ames 
knew Peterson had appointments with Dr. Rosen on Tuesday, January 
18 and with Dr. Harris on Wednesday, January 19 does not support 
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Peterson's alleged assumption. The mere fact that Ames was aware 
of doctors' appointments does not signify that it believed Peterson 
would not show up for work at all on Tuesday and Wednesday. 
Rather, it merely supports an assumption that Ames realized 
Peterson's schedule at work would be curtailed and that he would be 
arriving late after meeting with his health care providers. By no 
stretch of the imagination can knowledge of these two doctor's 
appointments be used as the basis for an assumption that Ames did 
not expect Peterson at work at all these two days. 
Respondents argue at the bottom of page 11 that Ames 
failed to cite testimony in support of the Board of Review's 
factual findings that Peterson "was outside the regular course of 
business." While it is true that prior to January 17, Peterson had 
no set assignments, this situation changed. In attempting to place 
Peterson in the flagging job, Peterson would have had a set 
schedule. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that Peterson's 
work schedule would have followed the regular course of business 
had he shown up for the flagging job. Peterson had been in the 
construction industry long enough to be aware of the fact that the 
schedule for a flagging position was generally tied to the same 
shift as other workers on the job. 
In sum, Ames marshalled the facts in evidence which 
support the Board of Review's factual findings. 
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B. The Board of Review's Findings Are Not Supported By 
Substantial Evidence. 
According to respondents, Ames does not challenge the 
factual findings that on Monday, January 17, Peterson first went to 
his job site, picked up his check, told a co-worker about medical 
appointments, went to the appointments and then went home feeling 
ill (Respondents' Brief pp. 12-13). Further, respondents claim 
that the evidence in the record tends to show that Ames knew 
Peterson had medical appointments "that would keep him from work 
for a major portion of the day." These are not, however, the 
facts. Peterson had a single medical appointment (with his 
physical therapist) on Monday morning and not multiple appointments 
as respondents assume (R. 22) . Peterson testified he told Ron, a 
co-worker, to inform Stan Van Dam that Peterson was going to 
physical therapy and that he would talk to Van Dam later when he 
got back from physical therapy (R. 46). This, of course, did not 
occur. Instead, Peterson never showed up for work on Monday as he 
had said he would and as expected by Ames but, rather, went home. 
Ames was forced to call Peterson in order to find out where he had 
been and to ascertain his schedule for the next day. Thus, 
Peterson did not "report to work" on January 17 as promised. 
Respondents argue that Ames again knew Peterson was going 
to miss work because of medical appointments on Tuesday, January 
18, and, in addition, that Peterson correctly assumed Dr. Rosen 
contacted Stan Van Dam at Ames to let Ames know Peterson would not 
be at work Tuesday afternoon. Ames does not challenge the fact 
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that Peterson was going to miss work because of medical 
appointments Tuesday morning and that he reported this fact to 
Steve Pack, However, there is no evidence in the record to support 
the conclusion that because of this knowledge Ames did not expect 
to see Peterson in the afternoon. Ames also does not challenge the 
fact that Dr. Rosen apparently sent Peterson home after his 
appointment. However, there is no evidence that Ames was aware of 
this or that it knew Peterson would not be showing up for work at 
all on Tuesday, January 18. Thus, the evidence does not support 
the Board of Review's finding that on January 18, Peterson had 
adequate reason for not appearing at the worksite after his 
doctor's appointment, particularly since Peterson had not been in 
contact with anyone at Ames all day. 
Finally, with respect to Wednesday, January 19, although 
Peterson had an appointment with Dr. Harris, the doctor at the 
Kennecott Clinic (and not the "company doctor" as Ames contends), 
the evidence in the record indicates that Ames nevertheless 
reasonably expected Peterson to show up at work sometime that day 
and/or to call in. Ames had no way of knowing that there would be 
several hours between doctors' appointments and that Peterson would 
not finish physical therapy until 2:00 or 2:30 p.m. There is thus 
no evidence whatsoever in the record from which it might be 
concluded that Peterson met the requirements for "calling in" or 
"reporting to work." 
In sum, the Board of Review's factual findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
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entire record. The only times Peterson made any effort to contact 
Ames on January 17-19 was Monday morning, January 17, to pick up 
his pay check and Wednesday afternoon, near the end of his shift, 
when he called to inform Ames that it was too late to come to work 
that day. This evidence does not by any stretch of the imagination 
rise to the level required of an employee that he make a good faith 
effort to "call in" or "report to work." Consequently, this Court 
should hold that the Board of Review's factual findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
POINT II 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION 
THAT AMES DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE 
FOR DISCHARGING PETERSON IS NOT 
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL 
Respondents claim, gratuitously, that Ames "failed to 
show that the claimant even committed the behavior for which he was 
discharged" and that Ames "presented no evidence of what it meant 
by 'reporting to work' or 'calling in,' . . . " (Respondents' Brief 
pp. 16-17). None of the parties to the hearing, i.e., Peterson, 
Jim Howell or the Administrative Law Judge, seemed to have any 
problem at all with the terms "reporting to work" and "calling in." 
Indeed, both terms are self explanatory. "Reporting to work" means 
showing up at the work place ready to work. "Calling in" means 
contacting the employer by telephone, or by any other reasonable 
means. Ames expected Peterson to show up at work on Monday after 
his physical therapy appointment or, if he could not make it to 
work, to call and let Ames know he would not be there. Peterson 
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was aware, or should have been aware, of Ames's reasonable 
expectations• It is undisputed that Ames reasonably believed 
Peterson would show up for work on Tuesday, albeit late, but that 
Peterson, instead, neither contacted anyone at Ames nor showed up 
to work on Tuesday. Finally, Ames also reasonably expected that 
Peterson would show up for work on Wednesday although, again, 
probably late because of a doctor's appointment. Instead, he may 
(or may not) have called in at the end of his shift to tell Ames he 
was not coming into work that day. The telephone call, if actually 
made, was long overdue. 
Respondents assert that it was beyond Peterson's control 
to go back to work on any of the three days in question. The mere 
fact that an employee cannot go to work, however, does not relieve 
the employee of all obligations to the employer. All employers 
require reasonable notification prior to or at the beginning of a 
work shift (or as soon as possible if circumstances prevent) from 
the employee that he/she will not be at work. Peterson was 
certainly capable of picking up the telephone and calling Ames on 
each of these three days when he could not make it to work because 
of illness, rescheduled doctors' appointments and the like. Ames 
has, consequently, established that it had "just cause" for 
discharging Peterson: (1) Peterson was culpable because he made no 
attempt whatsoever to apprise his employer of his schedule and, 
indeed, appeared to be avoiding work; (2) Peterson had read Ames 
Employee Handbook and was aware of his obligations to call in 
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and/or show up for work; and (3) Peterson had control over his 
behavior on the three days in question. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should overrule the decision of the Board of 
Review and hold that Peterson was discharged from his employment 
with Ames for reasons that were disqualifying. This Court should 
further hold that an overpayment has been established pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-406 (5) (a) and that Ames is relieved of 
liability for charges in connection with Peterson's claims as 
provided by Utah Code Ann. § 3 5-4-7.5. 
DATED this 4th day of August, 1995. 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
v 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
Claudia F. Berry, Esq. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Ames Construction, Inc. 
CFB40 3 
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